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Articles Posted in NLRB Decisions

Labor organizing has helped workers in New Jersey and around the country achieve better pay and improved working conditions for over a century. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 protects workers’ right to engage in activities related to organizing and collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is charged with certifying labor unions and adjudicating disputes under the NLRA. A decision issued in March 2021 by the NLRB could be of note for those involved in New Jersey employment law matters. The board decided to retain the “contract bar rule,” which limits the time for filing any petition that challenges a union’s status while a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is in force.

Section 7 of the NLRA protects the rights of workers to “self-organization” and other labor organizing activities. Section 9(a) states that, once a majority of employees in a particular “unit,” have selected representatives for collective bargaining, they are the “exclusive representatives” for the employees in that unit. A union can lose its status as representative through a decertification petition filed with the NLRB. If at least thirty percent of the employees in a unit sign on to a petition to decertify the union, § 9(e) directs the NLRB to conduct a secret-ballot election of all employees to see if they favor decertification.

The contract-bar rule states that a petition to decertify a union cannot be filed during the first three years of a CBA, with two exceptions. First, a petition can be filed at any time if the CBA has a “union security clause” that “clearly” violates § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. A CBA cannot require all of the employees in a unit to pay union dues unless it gives each employee a thirty-day grace period after their employment begins. A CBA that does not include the thirty-day period could be found invalid.
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Workers are often best able to negotiate with their employers for better pay, safer or improved working conditions, and other features of employment when they can do so as a group. Many employers prefer, however, that their employees not do this. Federal and New Jersey labor laws protect workers’ right to organize for various purposes, including advocacy on co-workers’ behalf. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) investigates and adjudicates alleged violations of workers’ rights under federal law. A recent investigation by the NLRB found that a major online retailer violated the rights of two workers who advocated for better working conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. While it is not a formal decision by the Board, it could offer guidance to workers advocating for change at employers in New Jersey and around the country. If you have concerns regarding wage or labor practices at your place of employment, consider reaching out to a New Jersey employment lawyer to discuss your situation.

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), found at 29 U.S.C. § 157, guarantees the right of employees to “self-organization.” They can join an existing labor union or form their own. They can use collective bargaining procedures in negotiations with their employers. Finally, they can “engage in other concerted activities” related to “collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” The term “concerted activities” can cover a broad range of acts.

Under § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, id. at § 158(a)(1), an employer commits an “unfair labor practice” if they restrain or interfere with any activities that are protected by § 7. Section 8(a)(3) bars employers from discriminating against employees because of “membership in any labor organization.” New Jersey has even more extensive protections for employee organizing. See, e.g. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 34:13A-5.3, 34:13B-2.
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The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is charged with enforcing the federal statute that governs employees’ right to organize, engage in collective bargaining, and engage in other related activities. Its General Counsel (GC) investigates alleged violations of both employees’ and employers’ rights. The members of the Board itself adjudicate complaints filed by employees, employers, and labor unions. The recent change in presidential administrations brought some changes to positions at the NLRB, including a new acting GC. At the beginning of February 2021, the acting GC issued a memorandum, GC 21-02, rescinding several memoranda from the previous administration. At least one of the rescinded memos could impact New Jersey employee claims and affect similar cases throughout the country. GC 18-04 interpreted a 2017 decision by the Board regarding complaints about employer handbook policies.

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157, protects employees’ “right to self-organization,” to form or join labor unions, to engage in collective bargaining with their employers, “and to engage in other concerted activities” directed at these rights. Under § 8(a) of the NLRA, id. at § 158(a), employers may not restrain employees from exercising their rights under the statute, nor may they discriminate or retaliate against employees who engage in protected activities or complain about alleged violations.

The 2017 decision by the NLRB mentioned earlier dealt with a “facially neutral rule” in an employee handbook that allegedly violated workers’ rights under § 7. The rule in question restricted the use of cameras on the employer’s property. This included cell phones with cameras. An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that the rule violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, finding that “employees ‘would reasonably construe’ the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity.”

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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects the rights of employees to engage in activities related to organizing and collective bargaining. Workers alleging infringement of these rights can file a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and may wish to discuss their situation with a New Jersey employment attorney. In November 2019, the NLRB ruled on a charge alleging that a nonprofit organization’s executive director interfered with efforts to advocate on behalf of unpaid interns. The NLRB’s decision is notable for New Jersey workers in at least two ways. First, it demonstrates how the NLRA can protect workers before any significantly adverse actions, such as termination, occur. Second, the decision addresses the limits of the NLRA’s protection with regard to individuals who are not considered employees, such as unpaid interns.

Section 7 of the NLRA protects a wide range of activities related to “mutual aid or protection” of fellow employees. This includes specific actions like forming or joining a labor organization, as well as “other concerted activities.” Under § 8(a)(1) of the statute, employers may not “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees” with regard to any of the rights protected by § 7. The NLRA does not provide a clear definition of “employee.” Prior decisions by the NLRB have held that “receiv[ing] or anticipat[ing]…economic compensation” is an essential element to be considered an “employee” under the statute.

The respondent employer is a nonprofit organization headquartered in New York City, with several offices elsewhere around the country. According to the NLRB’s decision, the respondent’s Washington, D.C. office usually has twenty-five employees and fifteen interns. The interns are typically students who volunteer to work for the organization for one semester, and who receive no compensation for their work.

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Late last year, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued an important ruling regarding restrictions on the use of company email accounts by employees for non-work purposes. This ruling reverses a 2014 NLRB decision, which held that employment policies restricting the use of company email for union organizing purposes presumptively violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). It largely reinstates another NLRB ruling, this one from 2007, which allowed a ban on company email use. While the 2019 decision is a setback for employees’ workplace rights, it is not a complete return to the situation in 2007. The NLRB left some exceptions that would allow use of company email for union organizing purposes when employees have no other “reasonable means…to communicate with one another.” If you have questions concerning use of company email, contact a New Jersey employment attorney to learn more about how federal law may affect you.

The NLRA protects workers’ labor organizing rights and regulates the relationship between labor unions and employers. Section 7 of the statute, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157, states that employees have the right to organize, to form or join labor unions, to engage in other “concerted activities” related to organizing, and to refrain from any of those activities. Section 8(a), found at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), prohibits employers from interfering with those rights, restraining employees’ ability to exercise their rights, or discriminating against an employee for engaging in protected activities.

The 2007 NLRB decision held that “employees have no statutory right to use [an employer’s] e-mail system for Section 7 purposes.” The employer maintained a policy that “prohibit[ed] the use of e-mail for all ‘non-job-related solicitations.’” The Board held that employers’ property rights in their email systems allowed them to restrict non-work-related uses, including activities otherwise protected by the NLRA.

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The “sharing economy” has brought significant changes, both good and bad, to many aspects of the job market. Rideshare companies, for example, give drivers flexibility in terms of when and how long they work, but this has come with disadvantages. Some rideshare drivers have sought the protection of employment statutes in claims for unpaid wages and other matters. The question of whether they are employees, who are eligible for relief under those employment laws, or independent contractors remains largely unresolved. Various courts and administrative agencies have reached different conclusions. Two federal agencies, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD), recently issued opinions holding that rideshare drivers are independent contractors. The bases for their conclusions differ from the legal standard used in New Jersey.

A worker in New Jersey is deemed an “employee,” and therefore not an independent contractor, unless their employer can satisfy the three-prong “ABC test.” First, the employer must demonstrate that they do not exercise control over how the person does their job, and that their agreement with the person indicates that they will not exercise such control. Next, they must show that the job performed by the person is not part of their usual business, or that the person does their work away from the employer’s place of business. Finally, they must establish that the person has their own “independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.” N.J. Rev. Stat. § 43:21-19(i)(6).

The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the ABC test in a 2015 ruling. Several other states have also adopted it. The test generally applies to employee misclassification claims under state law. The 2015 case, for example, involved alleged violations of New Jersey’s wage and hour statutes. Claims under federal law may require separate analyses.
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A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is a contract between a labor union, which is legally authorized to negotiate on the employees’ behalf, and the company that employs the union’s members. When ownership of a business changes hands, the new owner is only subject to all of the terms of an existing CBA if it is a “perfectly clear successor” to the previous owner. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) developed a set of guidelines, known as the “perfectly clear successor” (PCS) rule, based on a 1972 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court. In April 2019, the NLRB issued a ruling that seems to limit the scope of the PCS rule.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits employers from interfering with or restraining efforts by employees to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining, either by forming a union or joining an existing organization. Employers may not discriminate or retaliate against employees who exercise any of the rights protected by the statute. Once an employer and a union enter into a CBA, the employer commits an unlawful act if it refuses to negotiate with its employees’ authorized representative.

In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that a successor employer must recognize a union’s authority when it has retained a majority of the union members as employees. This does not mean, however, that the successor employer is bound by the substantive terms of its predecessor’s CBA. The court held that a successor is not bound by the old CBA and is therefore free to set the initial terms for employment, unless “it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit.” NLRB v. Burns Int’l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 294-95 (1972).
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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects workers’ rights to engage in activities related to labor organizing. The statute established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to investigate and adjudicate alleged violations. Union organizing can now take place both online and in real life, and the NLRB regularly considers questions involving communications technologies like email. Its rulings can affect not just New Jersey employment law but workers in New Jersey and all over the country. In 2007, the NLRB ruled that employers can place restrictions on employees’ use of company email for non-work purposes, even if it might restrict employees’ ability to engage in NLRA-protected activities. It overturned that decision in 2014, but now the NLRB is asking the public to file briefs addressing whether it should return to the standard it established in 2007.

Section 7 identifies workers’ “right to self-organization,” and to engage in activities related to “bargain[ing] collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. An employer commits an “unfair labor practice” under § 8 of the NLRA if it “interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerce[s]” an employee attempting to exercise a protected right. Id. at § 158(a)(1). Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, and it last amended § 7 in 1947. The nature of union organizing has changed in many ways since that time, and the job of interpreting § 7 in light of new technologies has largely fallen on the NLRB.

In 2007, the NLRB ruled that “employees have no statutory right to use the [employer’s] e-mail system for Section 7 purposes.” The Guard Publishing Co. d/b/a The Register-Guard, et al, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007). The employer in that case, a newspaper, installed a computer system in 1996 that provided email accounts for many of the employees. It maintained a policy prohibiting employees from using their email accounts for “non-job-related solicitations.” Id. at 1111. An employee alleged violations of § 7 after the employer issued several written warnings to her about using her company email account to send notices about union activities. The NLRB affirmed an administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s) 2002 ruling that the employer’s policy did not violate § 8, but that the employer violated § 8 by enforcing the policy in a discriminatory manner.
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New Jersey labor laws protect the rights of workers to organize for the purpose of collectively asserting their workplace rights, such as by forming a union to engage in collective bargaining with their employer’s management. At the federal level, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects a wide range of activities related to organizing, and prohibits employers from interfering with employees in the exercise of those rights. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is charged with investigating and, in some cases, issuing rulings on alleged violations of the NLRA. An ongoing issue of dispute between employers and employees is the extent to which employers can bar their employees from engaging in organizing activities on the employer’s property. The NLRB recently ruled that an employer’s ban on solicitation on company property was an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. UPMC, 366 NLRB No. 142 (2018).

Section 7 of the NLRA protects workers’ “right to self-organization,” which includes the right “to form, join, or assist labor organizations.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. It is an “unfair labor practice” for employers “to interfere with [or] restrain…employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in” Section 7. Id. at § 158(a)(1). Employees may file complaints alleging unfair labor practices with the NLRB.

The NLRB’s website states the agency’s position regarding employees’ solicitation of their fellow employees for union membership: “Working time is for work.” Employers, according to the NLRB, are permitted to “maintain and enforce non-discriminatory rules limiting solicitation and distribution,” but they cannot prohibit such activity “during non-work time, such as before or after work or during break times.” It bases this position on U.S. Supreme Court decisions affirming the right to engage in solicitation outside of work hours. The UPMC case involves businesses providing healthcare services. The Supreme Court has ruled that “health care facilities [must] permit employee solicitation and distribution during nonworking time in nonworking areas,” provided that the employer has not shown that such activities cause “disruption of health care operations or disturbance of patients.” Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 507 (1978).

Class actions and collective actions allow numerous individuals with similar claims to bring a single lawsuit against a common defendant, rather than hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits. A New Jersey employee, for example, could file a collective action on behalf of themselves “or other employees similarly situated” for violations of state minimum wage law. See N.J. Rev. Stat. § 34:11-56a25. This offers many benefits for plaintiffs, particularly in situations where the cost of filing suit individually, when compared to the potential recovery, would make it too expensive to assert one’s legal rights. One could also argue that class actions help defendants by consolidating all claims against them into a single lawsuit, rather than hundreds or thousands of lawsuits. That is not how employers and other defendants usually see class actions, however, and they frequently argue against allowing employees to pool their claims in a single lawsuit. The U.S. Supreme Court recently sided with employers regarding collective arbitration, similar to collective or class actions. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. ___ (2018).

The ruling in Epic Systems arose from a conflict between two federal statutes: the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. The FAA generally states that arbitration clauses in written contracts “involving commerce” are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Courts have authority to order parties to such a contract to participate in arbitration, and to enforce the recommendations of the arbitrators. A court may only vacate or modify an arbitration award on grounds specified by the statute. See id. at §§ 10, 11. The Supreme Court held that the FAA applies to contracts executed under both state and federal law in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).

The NLRA protects the rights of workers to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining—i.e. to form or join labor unions—and “to engage in other concerted activities for” those purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 157. It is an “unfair labor practice” for employers to “interfere with” or “restrain” employers engaged in these protected activities. Id. at § 158(a)(1). Courts have given rather broad interpretation to the meaning of “concerted activities.” The question in Epic Systems concerned whether collective arbitration was a “concerted activity” protected by the NLRA, or whether the FAA required enforcement of arbitration clauses in individual employment contracts.
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